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Abstract
Identifying the effect of a ruler’s religious identity on policy is challenging because
religious identity rarely varies over time and place. We address this problem by exploiting quasi-random variation in the religion of rulers in the Indian Princely States.
Using data from the 1911 census, we find that Muslim-ruled states had lower Hindu
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Introduction

Scholars have long recognized the influence of religion on economic development.1 In recent
years the focus has shifted to uncovering specific mechanisms linking the two. One important
mechanism is human capital accumulation. Some studies show that religion and religious
institutions have a positive impact on education. For example, Becker and Wöessmann
(2008, 2009) find that all-Protestant counties had literacy rates that were 8 percentage points
higher than all-Catholic counties, and they ascribe this difference to past, institutionalized
incentives to acquire human capital. Botticini and Eckstein (2005, 2007) make a similar
case connecting Jewish human capital to long-run economic outcomes. Other studies such
as Berman (2000) highlight the negative impact of religion on education; in his study, ultraOrthodox Jews spend too much time attending school (Yeshiva) rather than working, leaving
many in relative poverty. Although these studies highlight the importance of religion for
human capital development, the debate on the underlying mechanisms continues.
Our paper relates to this literature by studying whether the religious identity of unelected
rulers impacts education. We exploit an exceptionally unique historical setting: the Indian
Princely States. British colonial rule in India was comprised of territories under direct
rule, British India and territories under indirect colonial rule, the Princely States. The
latter states were under the direct rule of hereditary rulers who controlled local affairs
while the British controlled foreign policy. Princely States were spread all over the subcontinent with substantial heterogeneity in the religion of the rulers. A majority of the
states were ruled by Hindus (80%), but a non-trivial number were ruled by Muslims (15%)
and Sikhs (5%). Importantly, the religion of the ruler was not strictly a function of regional
religious affiliation; many Muslim kings ruled over predominantly Hindu populations, while
many Hindu kings ruled over Muslim populations. Many states were established in the 18th
century by mercenaries and warriors that offered military protection to the local population.
In these conquest states the rulers were often unconnected to the local population, suggesting
a degree of randomness in the religion of the ruler because the ruler’s religion was often not
a function of economic, religious, or demographic characteristics of the people.
Using data from the 1911 and 1931 census of India, we find that states with Muslim rulers
had lower literacy on average than states with non-Muslim, mostly Hindu rulers. It could
1

The classic examples are Weber’s (1905) Protestant Ethic hypothesis and Tawney’s (1926) rebuttal.
More recently, economists have made all sorts of connections mapping some aspect of religion to economic
development. See, for instance, Greif (1994, 2006), Grier (1997), Barro and McCleary (2003), Guiso et al.
(2003), Botticini and Eckstein (2005, 2007), Noland (2005), Arruñada (2010), Rubin (2011), Kuran (2011),
Spenkuch (2011), Jha (2013), Bhalotra et al. (2014), Cantoni (2014), Greif and Rubin (2015), and Iyigun
(2015).
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be that Muslim-ruled states were negatively selected, which would explain the lower levels
of literacy. For example, if Muslim-ruled states were poorer and less developed on average
than non-Muslim states, then income differences may be driving the results and not the
Muslim identity of the ruler. To test this possibility we control for differences in geography
and development, and we find similar results. Next, we decompose literacy by religion. We
find that Muslim rulers did not impact Muslim literacy – the coefficient on Muslim ruler
is small, positive and statistically insignificant. But, Muslim rulers had a large, negative,
and statistically significant impact on Hindu literacy. In addition, we explore the impact
of Muslim rulers on the provision of railways, an expensive infrastructure undertaking in
this period. We find no differential impact of Muslim rulers on the availability or quality of
railways. Interestingly, revenues are the key determinant of whether states funded railways.
We rely on a simple theoretical model to account for these patterns. In our model a
ruler provides a non-excludable public good and has a preference for providing for his coreligionists, ceteris paribus. Two results follow from this framework. The first (and more
trivial) result is that a ruler provides more public goods when a greater share of his subjects
are his co-religionists, regardless of the properties of the public good. The second, more
nuanced result is that the existence of substitutes provided by private markets affects the
provision of the public good, but only if the private good is excludable by religion. The idea is
that if the good is also provided privately to the ruler’s co-religionists, the ruler provides less
of the public good, since it is non-excludable and his co-religionists receive lower marginal
utility from its provision.2 An example of such a quasi-public good is education, which is
provided by the state and the private sector, but discrimination on the basis of religion is
more likely in the private sector, especially in a historical context when many private schools
were also religious schools.3
By the early 20th century, Muslim religious schools were more prevalent than Hindu religious schools in colonial India. The model therefore predicts that Hindus living in Muslimruled states would have worse educational outcomes because Muslim rulers would spend
2

This insight is consistent with the recent literature suggesting that religious expenditure and public good
provision are substitutes (Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004; Hungerman 2005; Hungerman and Gruber 2007), but
the mechanism is different; those works suggest that public expenditure crowds out religious expenditure,
while our model suggests the reverse. This insight is also consistent with Franck and Rainer (2012), who find
that rulers exhibit ethnic favoritism in sub-Saharan Africa, favoritism is an important factor in determining
education outcomes, and the presence of favoritism is mitigated when citizens belong primarily to one
dominant religion.
3
Another example of a public good that is excludable by religion is charity, which has traditionally been
privately provided in many Christian and Islamic lands. Indeed, Huber and Stanig (2011) suggest that
privately-provided charity can create voting cleavages amongst charity recipients based on whether they
receive charity from the state or from religious institutions. This insight is related to the one presented in
this paper, although Huber and Stanig are interested in a democratic context and we are not.
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less on public education. Meanwhile, the effect on Muslim education outcomes would be
minimal because the private sector via Muslim religious schools makes up for the short fall.
This accords with our findings above: the Hindu literacy rate is 2 to 3 percentage points
lower in Muslim-ruled states, while there is no statistically significant effect of Muslim rule
on Muslim literacy. Yet, we find only weak support for our other hypothesis relating public
good outcomes to the share of the ruler’s co-religionists. We find that literacy rates for both
Hindus and Muslims are greater in Muslim-ruled regions when there is a higher share of
Muslims, but the coefficients are not precisely estimated.
We use data on public schools, railways (mentioned above) and post offices to further
test the theory. The Imperial Gazetteer of India (Hunter et al., 1907) records the number of
public schools and enrollment as of 1903-04 for many Princely States. We combed through
the history of each state in the Imperial Gazetteer extracting any information on public
schools and enrollment as of 1903-04. This information was noted for many but not all
the states in our sample. Consistent with our model, we find Muslim rulers are negatively
correlated with public schools and enrollment. Unlike education, for which there was a
privately available substitute, there were no widespread substitutes for railways or post
offices, and certainly none that could be excluded by religion. Both railways and post
offices were generally linked to their British Indian counterparts and were far superior to
alternatives provided by the private sector. Hence, our model suggests the presence of a
Muslim ruler should not influence the provision of railways or post offices. And, this is what
we find. Although Muslim rulers were more likely to fund railways and provide one or more
post offices, these estimates are statistically insignificant.
Clearly Princely States were not randomly assigned to Muslim rulers. Hence, we worry
that Muslim ruled states are a selected sample, different from non-Muslim ruled states. For
example, if Muslim ruled states were more positively selected, we would expect an upward
bias on the estimate for Muslim rule, and the opposite if Muslim ruled states were negatively
selected. To address such concerns we use recent matching techniques based on inverse
probability weights to compare outcomes in Muslim ruled states with observationally similar
Hindu ruled states. The matching results are similar to our cross-sectional regressions. In
particular, we find Muslim rule has a negative and significant impact only on Hindu literacy.
We find negative effects on public schools and enrollment but the coefficients are not precisely
estimated.
While our model emphasizes one particular mechanism, we consider other competing
explanations. The most important one is that Muslim rulers were more likely to hire local
Muslims as bureaucrats to run their administration. This would suggest Hindu literacy
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was lower in Muslim-ruled states because Hindus were unlikely to serve these roles and
hence Muslim rulers were unlikely to patronize public schools attended by Hindus. Much
of the qualitative literature suggests both Hindu and Muslim rulers relied on outsiders for
key administrative positions. This ensured local elites could not unite against the ruling
family. Moreover, there was no strong religious element to these positions. Hindu kings hired
non-local Muslim administrators while Muslim rulers commonly hired Hindu administrators.
Finally, a pure patronage story would suggest we find both positive effects on Muslim literacy
and negative effects on Hindu literacy. In contrast, we only find negative effects on Hindu
literacy.
Another explanation relates to which groups converted to Islam in this period, and relatedly whether Muslim rule influenced the types of Muslims who may have migrated to the
Princely States. It was not uncommon to observe Hindus convert to Islam, Christianity,
and other religions during the colonial period and before. Unfortunately we lack strong
quantitative evidence on who converted, when and why. This suggests the Muslim population share in 1911 may be endogenous to the religion of the ruler. If upper caste and more
educated Hindus converted to Islam in Muslim ruled states to court favor and patronage,
then such positive selection out of the Hindu population could account for our findings.
But the historical accounts indicate conversion to Islam was more common among the lower
Hindu castes suggesting if anything a negative selection into Islam. Similarly if Muslim rule
attracted more educated Muslims to their states, then we should expect a positive coefficient
on Muslim rule for Muslim literacy that we do not find. Although we cannot rule out all
competing explanations, we believe the evidence on literacy and public goods supports our
preferred theoretical mechanism.
Our paper contributes to two distinct literatures. First, a growing literature has developed on different aspects of religion and colonial rule in India. Jha (2013) finds that incidents
of Hindu-Muslim conflict are significantly lower between 1850 and 1950 in medieval ports
on account of interethnic complementarities. Such a legacy of ethnic tolerance continues
to mitigate against conflict even today (Jha 2014). Iyer (2010) is among the first credible
economic studies comparing the performance of the Princely States to areas under direct
colonial rule (British India). She finds that Princely States have better economic outcomes
in post-independence India with many of the differences (e.g., education) dating to the colonial period. Interestingly, she finds no differences in economic outcomes for Muslim-ruled
states relative to the rest of India in the post-independence period. In separate work focusing on British India, we find districts that experienced a more recent collapse of Muslim
(primarily Mughal) rule have worse literacy outcomes (Chaudhary and Rubin 2011). We
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argue this was due to the strength of religious authorities in these areas, who were better
able to provide alternatives to public schools. However, the focus on British India entails
there is no variation in the religion of the ruler and so in that study we could not speak to
how the religious identity of a ruler affects incentives to provide public goods and literacy.
A second literature that this paper contributes to is the growing literature connecting
religion to economic outcomes via religious, political, and economic institutions. This literature challenges the early-20th century tradition dating back to Weber (1905) and Tawney
(1926) which suggests that there are certain aspects of religion that are either friendly (e.g.,
a “work ethic”) or inimical (e.g., restrictions on taking interest) to economic growth. In this
view, institutions are more important than the content of religion per se. That is, religious
laws and authorities place constraints on the choice sets of political authorities, and these
constraints are manifested in different ways depending on the institutional past. In particular, comparative works show how different institutional relationships between Muslim
and non-Muslim regions led to long-run differences in financial institutions and instruments
(Kuran 2005, 2011; Rubin 2010), reaction to technology (Coşgel et al. 2012a, 2012b), trade
institutions (Greif 1994, 2006), and laws (Rubin 2011).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the historical background
on Indian Princely States; Section 3 outlines our formal model relating the religion of the
ruler to public good provision; Section 4 places the theoretical predictions from our model
into historical context; Section 5 describes the data; Section 6 lays out the empirical strategy;
Section 7 presents the results, and Section 8 concludes.

2

Historical Background on the Princely States

2.1

State Formation and Relationship with British India

The Indian Princely States were parts of South Asia that came under indirect colonial control
in the 18th and 19th century (as opposed to areas under direct colonial rule i.e., British
India).4 Per the official definition, a Princely State was a “political community, occupying a
territory in India of defined boundaries, and subject to a common and responsible ruler who
has actually enjoyed and exercised, as belonging to him in his own right duty recognized
by the supreme authority of the British Government, any of the functions and attributes of
internal sovereignty” (House of Commons 1913, p. 14). These states were ruled by hereditary
kings who negotiated either official treaties or certificates of protection with the East India
See Roy (2013) for an economic history of India in the 18th century. He provides details on the emergence
and subsequent development of Princely States in this period.
4

5

Company.5
As part of these contracts, hereditary rulers deferred to the British Crown with regard
to foreign policy and military related matters. They could not enter political relations with
foreign countries or other Princely States without explicit permission of the Government of
India (GOI). Some states were allowed to maintain a small military force for internal order
and were expected to contribute troops, cavalry and other resources to colonial military
efforts when necessary. In exchange, these states were allowed to manage their own internal
affairs including tax collection and the provision of public services. However, the British
Crown reserved the right to intervene in internal matters in “cases of grave misrule, or to
prevent disputed successions or rebellion, or the dismemberment of a State by division or
legacy” (House of Commons 1913, p. 15).6 We combed through individual histories of the
states in the Imperial Gazetteer of India (Hunter et al. 1907) and found that just over
a quarter of Princely States had been reprimanded or experienced an intervention by the
Government of India as of 1904.
By the early 20th century, there were 693 Princely States with substantial differences
between them in area, population, and autonomy. The largest Princely State of Hyderabad
commanded an area of 82,000 square miles and a population of over 13 million in 1912.
It had the authority to mint its own coins and was allowed to levy the death penalty on
its subjects. On the other extreme, many smaller states in western India consisted of a
few villages with limited judicial powers of civil or criminal enforcement. By 1911, the GOI
categorized 83 states as salute states based on their importance to the British Crown. Salute
states received 3 to 21 ceremonial gun salutes (i.e., gun firings) when their rulers visited the
GOI capital at Delhi (Jeffrey 1978). In our regressions, we control for the number of gun
salutes to capture the importance of the state to the GOI.
Princely States were scattered throughout the subcontinent with large concentrations
in western and central India. As the Mughal Empire declined in the early 18th century,
many regional states emerged to replace Mughal rule. The strongest of these states (the
Maratha Dominion in western India, Hyderabad in the Deccan plateau, and Mysore in
southern India) wrestled for control with the East India Company. After multiple battles
and alliances with regional powers, the Company emerged triumphant by the early 19th
century with the largest territories under their command. British India included the coastal
5

Before the First War of Independence (also known as Indian Mutiny) in 1857, the East India Company
was in control of the Indian sub-continent. Beginning in 1858 the British Crown took over control from the
Company.
6
Mysore is perhaps the most famous case where the GOI brought the state under direct colonial control
in 1831 on account of years of mismanagement. The original Hindu rulers were restored as rulers in 1881.
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provinces of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras and the alluvial plains along the Ganga river
valley. Most of north India also came under direct British control by the mid-19th century.
Figure 1 shows a 1911 map of India distinguishing British India from the Princely States.7
The Company initially set up trading posts in Indian ports under the patronage of
Mughal emperors. It followed that the early territories to come under British rule were
along the coast. For example, Bengal, a former Mughal province and important regional
state of the 18th century, was the first region taken over by the Company in 1757. As they
gradually annexed new territory over the next 100 years, the British favored agriculturally
or commercially advanced regions. Arid desserts in the west and parts of central India with
low agriculture potential were intentionally left under the control of local rulers. Many such
states would have been unable to survive to the 20th century without British protection,
as large states with bigger armies would have annexed the smaller states (Jeffrey 1978,
Ramusack 2004). In fact, the Company intentionally kept some areas under local rule in the
first phase of annexation to create a barrier between them and the strong regional states
of the 18th century.8 Yet, random factors also contributed to the division between Princely
States and British India; indeed, historian Robin Jeffrey has argued that there “was an
awesome arbitrariness about who got a treaty and who did not” (Jeffrey 1978, p. 7).

2.2

Religion of Princely State Rulers

Princely States were of three broad types: antique states, successor states, and conquest
states (Ramusack 2004). Antique states had long historical roots predating the arrival of
the Europeans. For example, the ancient Rajput-ruled states of western India existed before
the arrival of the Mughals. They survived the Mughal Empire by marrying their daughters
to Mughal emperors in exchange for local autonomy (Ramusack 2004). Successor states
were former provinces of the Mughal Empire that emerged as independent states when the
power of the Empire declined in the 18th century. Only one of these states, Hyderabad,
survived British annexation and the other two (Bengal and Awadh) became part of British
India. Most remaining states were founded in the 18th century by mercenaries that offered
military protection to local populations. The rulers in these conquest states in many cases
had no historical relationship to the area or local population. In a few cases the territory
7

See Iyer (2010) for more details on changes in the British annexation policy over time. The British
did not annex many territories after 1857 and there were no annexations in the year of our study. Mandar
and Swamy (2012) and Roy (2013) also offer details on how the East India Company became the dominant
political player in this period.
8
This was known as the Policy of the Ring Fence and was dominant from 1765 to 1818.
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under their control was also not contiguous.9
Our analysis exploits a unique and understudied feature of the Princely States: the religion of the ruler. While Hindu kings ruled most states, Muslim and Sikh rulers were not
uncommon (15 and 5 percent of states in our sample, respectively). Muslim ruled states
existed in every region (see Figure 1) and were not necessarily correlated with large local
Muslim populations. Drawing on the Imperial Gazetteer of India (Hunter et al., 1907),
Appendix Table A.1 briefly summarizes the founding of the Muslim states. Muslim ruled
states were generally founded by Mughal nobles or members of the military after the death
of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707. For example, the Muslim rulers of Balasinor,
Junagadh, and Radhanpur were descendants of a distinguished Mughal officer, Sher Khan
Babi, who successfully overthrew the Mughal governor above him in the 18th century. Another example is the case of Asaf Jah, a military noble of the Mughal court who was sent
by the Mughal Emperor to serve as the governor of Hyderabad province. He soon found
himself strong enough to distance the province from the Mughal Empire, and he established
the largest Muslim ruled Princely State over a Hindu majority population. Asaf Jah’s
descendants also founded the state of Baoni in central India.
Many soldiers of the Mughal army became mercenaries for the emerging Maratha leaders
as the Mughal Empire weakened. In exchange they received territory in Rajasthan and
central India. For example, Amir Khan, was one such mercenary who founded the state of
Tonk in Rajputana. The Maratha chief Holkar Rao initially rewarded Amir Khan with this
land and then the British offered him indirect rule if he gave up attacking other parts of the
region. In neighboring central India, Amir Khan’s brother-in-law, Gafur Khan, established
the Muslim ruled state of Jaora, again supported by the Holkar. The East India Company
signed a treaty with Gafur Khan in exchange for providing six hundred horses and a certain
number of troops while recognizing that “his [Gafur Khan’s] race being as much a foreign race
in the eyes of the aboriginal inhabitants as is that of the British” (Malleson 1875, p. 221).
Against this backdrop it is unsurprising that almost 50% of Muslim rulers had no strong ties
to the populations that came under their rule. In comparison, 90% of non-Muslim rulers
had historical links to their local populations.10
Muslim rulers also built ties with the British. In Punjab, Dujana, and Pataudi were
land grants, i.e., the territory of the entire state, to loyal Muslims who worked for Lord
Lake, the commander-in-chief of the British military in the early 19th century. The Muslim
rulers of Palanpur were attacked by the Marathas and sought protection from the East India
9

For example, the state of Baroda included territories intermixed with districts of British India and other
Princely States.
10
This is based on calculations using the history in the Imperial Gazetteer (Hunter et al., 1907).
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Company. As these examples illustrate, many Muslim rulers were connected to their local
area and population by conquest supported externally either by the Mughal Empire, the
Marathas, or the East India Company. That is, while rulers were not exactly randomly
assigned to a state, in many cases the religion of the ruler was not a function of the religious
or economic characteristics of the population.
Once a state came under native rule, there was remarkable persistence in the religion
of the ruler. The Princely States were autocracies and rulers remained in power until their
death, at which point the nearest male heir (or female in the case of Bhopal) took the
throne.11 If the heir was a minor, British appointed officials assisted during the transition
along with state ministers. The chief ministers (diwans) appointed by the rulers played
a central role managing tax collection and the general administration of the state including public services.12 Many rulers recruited non-locals for these administrative jobs. This
neutralized the power of local elites and ensured that positions close to the ruler were occupied by non-locals loyal to the ruler. Rulers in the progressive southern states of Cochin,
Travancore, and Mysore recruited non-Malayali, Marathi, and Tamil brahmans to serve as
their chief ministers. Bengali kayasths and Kashmiri brahmans were common administrators in the northern states (Ramusack 2004).13 Interestingly, the administrators did not
always share the religion of the ruler. For example, the Hindu ruler of Alwar intentionally
recruited Muslim diwans who did not share any religious bonds with the local nobility (Jeffrey 1978). Broadly, this suggests that public schools did not educate state administrators
and bureaucrats in this context.
In the 18th and early 19th centuries, both Muslim and non-Muslim states were frequently
fighting each other or (more often) the East India Company. Public money largely went
to support military campaigns and the provision of public goods was ignored (Roy 2013).
Beginning in the mid-19th century, however, the situation changed. Rulers began to adopt
policies from other states and neighboring British India. They promoted railways, post offices, and public schools within their domain. For example, public schooling thrived under
the guidance of the Gaekwad of Baroda, a progressive Hindu ruler who introduced compulsory education more than fifteen years before a similar policy was enacted in British India.
11

Mysore is an exception to this rule because it was ruled by Hindus, then taken over briefly by Haider
Ali and his son Tipu Sultan, but the East India Company restored the former Hindu Wodeyar rulers to the
throne after they defeated Tipu Sultan.
12
Diwans appear to have played a key role in the provision of railways in some states (e.g., in Hyderabad
[Ray 1984]).
13
In the 20th century, conflicts arose in many states between these ‘foreign bureaucrats’ and the local
populations desirous of greater participation in the administration of their states. See Jeffrey (1978) for the
consequences of such divides in the case of Hyderabad.
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A coalition of states in Bombay (Hindu and Muslim) developed a joint railway project to
facilitate trade. These public services came on the scene many decades after the founding
of Princely States and reflected 19th and 20th century priorities. Rulers of both religions
were key to whether such schemes were adopted and extended. These rulers were important
players in local affairs and the allocation of public goods. Our main focus is on whether the
religion of the ruler had a differential impact of the provision of these services.

3

A Simple Model of Religious Identity and Public Good
Provision

In this section, we present a simple model of religious identity and public good provision.
The model provides intuition and testable predictions which guide our analysis. We stress
that there are many possible mechanisms connecting the religion of a ruler to public good
provision, and we highlight only one. Indeed, since most of the potential mechanisms are
unobservable (including the one highlighted here) and therefore untestable, the best one can
do is to flesh out the implications of the mechanism and test those implications. This is
the approach that we take. It is possible - indeed, probable - that other mechanisms played
a role in determining the relationship between religious identity and public good provision.
But, as we show below, the mechanism that we focus on accounts for many non-obvious
empirical observations.
The model solves for a partial equilibrium. We only consider the decisions made by a
ruler; the “decisions” made by subjects and other political agents are left in the background.
Hence, decisions are not strategic. The ruler simply maximizes his utility subject to the
constraints he faces. The benefit of the model’s simplicity is that it permits straight-forward
comparative statics, which we test with data from the Princely States.
Consider a world with two religions, r1 and r2 , where r1 is the religion of the Ruler (R).
Fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of the (non-modeled) subjects practice religion r1 , while fraction 1 − α
practice r2 . R has access to tax revenue T ∈ R+ , which he splits between public good
expenditure and all other expenditure. This is a simplified, reduced-form representation
of the idea that rulers gain utility foremost from staying in power. In the reduced form,
rulers can increase their likelihood of staying in power by spending on public goods and
other types of spending. Public goods can contribute to a ruler’s stability because they help
reduce unrest, decrease the attractiveness of alternatives to the ruler, and increase the tax
base (they also contribute to personal glory, which may enter the ruler’s utility function).
For the sake of the model, we are unconcerned why the ruler desires public goods, so long
10

as they provide some benefit. Other types of expenditure also help keep the ruler in power:
military spending, funding a bureaucracy, or buying off the elite. The ruler chooses to spend
G ∈ [0, T ] on public good provision and the rest on other expenditure (T −G). By its nature,
the public good is not excludable, and it is therefore available to all subjects regardless of
their religion.
Private markets also produce a good that is a close substitute to the public good. Unlike
goods provided by the ruler, goods provided by private markets are excludable (e.g., religious
education). Specifically, private markets provide gi ∈ R+ of the good to each subject of
religion ri . Assuming that all subjects consume an equal amount of the public good, the
total amount of the good (and close substitute) consumed by subjects of religion r1 is
G1 = αG + g1 , while the amount consumed by subjects of religion r2 is G2 = (1 − α) G + g2 .
As noted above, R derives utility from consumption of the good by the subjects. Assume
that, all else equal, he derives more utility when subjects of his own religion consume the
good than when subjects of the other religion consume the good.14 In other words, R
is concerned with the weighted sum of subjects’ consumption, where the weight on the
consumption of subjects of religion 1 is greater than that of religion 2. Denote the weighted
sum as GR = βG1 +G2 , where β ∈ (1, ∞). β is interpreted as the ruler’s “identity preference”
parameter; the greater β is, the more that R derives utility from the consumption of his
co-religionists relative to those of the other religion. This is the only assumption we make
in which the ruler’s religious identity matters. R’s optimization problem can therefore be
written as:15

max U = u GR , T − G ,
(1)
G

where ui > 0,uii < 0, u12 > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}, and u (·) is well-behaved and twice-differentiable.
The assumption u12 > 0 indicates that providing the public good and other expenditures
are complementary inputs into securing the ruler’s power.
The maximization problem represented in (1) can be re-written as a function of G, since
GR = βG1 + G2 = (1 + α (β − 1)) G + βg1 + g2 :
max U = u ((1 + α (β − 1)) G + βg1 + g2 , T − G) .
G

(2)

It follows from the first-order condition of (2) that the optimal amount of G, denoted
14

For the classic analysis of the manner in which identity enters into the utility function, see Akerlof and
Kranton (2000).
15
Formally, R maximizes u (·) subject to the constraint G ≤ T . We assume that this constraint is not
binding in equilibrium and do not consider it for the remainder of the analysis.
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G∗ , is uniquely solved in the following equation:16
u2
= 1 + α (β − 1) .
u1

(3)

It is straight-forward to show that there are increasing differences in {G, −g1 , −g2 }. This
is unsurprising, since a greater level of private good provision makes public good provision
less valuable on the margin. It thus follows from monotone comparative statics (Milgrom
and Shannon 1994; Topkis 1998) that the equilibrium level of public good provision, G∗ ,
is decreasing in the level of private good provision of either religion (g1 or g2 ). It is also
∂G∗
∂G∗
straight-forward to show, using the Implicit Function Theorem, that
=β
. This is
∂g1
∂g2
also unsurprising, as R derives a multiple of β more marginal utility from g1 than from g2
∂U
∂U
= βu1 ,
= u1 ).
(i.e.,
∂g1
∂g2
In other words, the amount of public good provision is decreasing in the level of private
good provision, and the magnitude of the decrease is greater when the private good is
provided to subjects of the same religion as the ruler. The intuition underlying this result is
straight-forward. Since the ruler cares more about the consumption of subjects of his religion
(i.e., β > 1), an increase in g1 reduces the marginal gain in utility from increasing G by more
than a similar increase in g2 (since R’s utility is subject to diminishing marginal returns).
An increase in g1 also increases the marginal gain from the ruler’s consumption (i.e., T − G)
more than a similar increase in g2 , since the ruler’s consumption and the consumption of
the public good are complements. This result is summarized in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 (Private Good Effect): The level of public good provision is decreasing in
the level of private good provision, ceteris paribus, and the magnitude of this effect is
greater for private good provision targeted at subjects of the ruler’s religion.
Next, consider how the population share of the ruler’s co-religionists, α, affects public good
provision. Increasing α has two countervailing effects. One effect is that it increases the
multiplier associated with GR . Since the ruler is more concerned with the amount of the
public good consumed by his co-religionists, he benefits more from higher G when α is
large. On the contrary, as α increases, diminishing returns kick in, thereby reducing the
∂G∗
attractiveness of increasing G. Hence,
is either negative or positive, depending on
∂α
which effect is stronger. In order to derive a comparative static result that sheds light on
the case of the Princely States, we assume that G∗ is relatively small and hence marginal
2

16

It is straightforward to see that the second-order condition holds, as (1 + α (β − 1)) u11 −
2 (1 + α (β − 1)) u12 + u22 < 0.
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returns are minimally diminishing.17 Under these conditions, the former effect dominates
and G∗ is increasing in α. This result is summarized in Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 (Population Share Effect): When G is sufficiently small, the level of public
good provision is increasing in the share of the population that are co-religionists with
the ruler, ceteris paribus.

4

Testable Predictions in Historical Context

The model highlights two avenues through which a ruler’s identity can affect public good
provision: the Private Good Effect and the Population Share Effect. The former effect arises
when a close substitute of the public good is provided by private markets. If it is provided
more to the ruler’s co-religionists by private markets, the ruler will provide less of the public
good, since it is less valuable on the margin to his co-religionists. The Population Share
Effect simply indicates that rulers provide more of a public good when there is a greater
share of their co-religionists in the population.
These two effects are not mutually exclusive, although it is an inherently empirical
question as to whether either or both arises in the real world. The strength of both effects
is dependent on the shape of the ruler’s utility function. If either effect enters weakly into
the ruler’s utility function, statistically and economically insignificant results will follow.
In this section, we discuss the testable implications of the model for the Indian Princely
States in the early 20th century. As we describe in the next section, we have collected data
on religion-specific literacy (for Hindus and Muslims) in 1911 and 1931, the number of public
schools and enrollment in these schools as of 1904, 1911 railway provision, and 1911 post
office provision for the Princely States. These variables provide a nice test of the model’s
predictions, since the model predicts that they should be affected in different ways by the
religious identity of the ruler.
First, consider the effect that ruler identity has on literacy (via investment in schools).
There were three types of schools in the Princely States: public schools supported by the
state, religious schools (of which Muslim maktabs and madrasas were more common than
Hindu schools), and private schools maintained by local landlords or Christian missions.
The ruler was instrumental in the provision of public schools that were the most widespread.
Demand for schooling was weak in the local population, and public schools were free in many
∂G∗
Formally,
> 0 if u1 + (1 + (β − 1) α) Gu11 − Gu12 > 0. This is clearly positive as G → 0 unless
∂α
u111 or u112 have odd properties. We do not wish to speculate on the sign or magnitude of third derivatives,
and instead focus only on the part of the parameter space where a clean comparative static result arises.
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if not most states. Muslims were more likely to attend religious schools, while Hindus were
more likely to attend public or missionary schools.18 Christian missions were less common
in the Princely States compared to British India. In the context of the model, the fact that
Muslims were more likely to go to religious schools meant that a close substitute for public
education expenditures was provided on a proportionately greater basis to Muslims than to
Hindus.
Unlike education, railways and post offices in the Princely States were supported by the
state and not provided by the private sector (i.e., g1 = g2 = 0). Moreover, they were both
non-excludable. The first Indian railways were constructed in British India in the 1850s by
private British companies under the supervision of the colonial GOI. Few of these initial
lines passed through Princely State territory. Beginning in the 1870s, the Government of
India sanctioned new lines passing through the Rajputana States but retained ownership of
the lines. The Princely States had no decision making authority over GOI owned lines in
their territory. Hyderabad was among the first Princely States to undertake direct railway
construction. The Nizam (Muslim ruler of Hyderabad) provided the land free of cost to
a private company to build the line, which opened in 1874. Subsequent operations were
initially managed by the State and then by a private company, His Highness the Nizam’s
Guaranteed State Railway Company. The company was offered similar terms as other private
railway companies in British India. Other states such as Baroda, Mysore, Travancore, and
Cochin followed shortly. By 1911, 37 Princely States owned some type of railway.
In many cases, the construction and operation of the railways was undertaken by British
companies operating railways in neighboring regions of British India. Princely States provided free land and capital for these railways. The GOI was often party to the negotiations
between the states and companies. In a few cases, a group of states jointly financed the construction and operation of railways through their territories. For example, the Bhavnagar18

Official education reports of this period often include a chapter on Muslim education, which highlight
the difficulties of expanding basic education in Muslim communities because of their emphasis on religious
instruction at an early age. Based on first hand accounts of districts in British India, the report says “In the
case of a young Muhammadan, the teaching of the mosque must precede the lessons of the school. He enters
school later than the Hindu. He must commonly pass some years in going through a course of sacred learning
before he is allowed to turn his thoughts to secular instruction. The years which the young Hindu gives to
English and mathematics in a public school, the young Muhammadan devotes in a madrasa to Arabic and
the law and theology of Islam” (Government of India 1914, p. 245). If anything, such patterns were probably
more stark in the Princely States since education systems were less developed than in British India. Princely
State rulers also differed in their promotion of education based on their religion. For example, rulers of Hindu
states such as Baroda and Kolhapur contributed heavily to the Deccan education society (a regional society)
in the late 19th and early 20th century, and other Muslim rulers supported efforts to promote a pan-Indian
version of Islam among Muslims (Ramusack 2004). Iyer et al. (2014) provide evidence from contemporary
India that Muslims are still much more likely than Hindus to send their children to private religious schools.
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Gondal railway was a collaboration between Hindu and Muslim ruled Princely States in
western India.
In theory and practice, railways were non-excludable by religion.19 Any individual with
the money to buy a ticket could ride on the train. In principle, rulers could have placed
stations strategically to benefit their co-religionists, but the discussion of religion never
appears anywhere in the qualitative evidence on railways. In our analysis, we construct an
indicator for whether a state had an ownership stake in a railway. This involved explicitly
pledging capital to the line. For the set of Princely railways, we also test for differences in
capital, mileage, gauge and operations between Muslim and non-Muslim states.
A uniform postal system was first created by the East India Company within its Indian
territories at the end of the 18th century.20 The system initially only allowed for public correspondence, but was soon opened to private communications for a small postage fee. In the
1830s, the British abolished all private posts and created a public Imperial Post to manage
both public and private communications. As the Imperial Post was expanding in British India, many Princely States began to develop their own postal systems and individual postage
stamps.21 However, the GOI soon felt the need for a uniform postal network extending to
the Princely States. The first joint ventures between the GOI and various Princely States
allowed for the “mutual exchange of correspondence” (Clarke 1921, p. 114). But, in the
final form the Imperial Post took over the native postal service beginning with the state of
Mysore in 1887. Such takeovers were conditional on the consent of the Princely ruler and
his court. By the 1920s, a majority of the post offices in the Princely States were under
the Imperial Post. The notable exceptions were the states of Hyderabad, Gwalior, Jaipur,
Patiala, and Travancore, who continued to manage their own post offices. Again, we observe
no religious pattern. Gwalior, Jaipur and Travancore were ruled by Hindus, Hyderabad by
a Muslim, and Patiala by a Sikh ruler.
Similar to railways, the history of postal services suggests there were no private substitutes to the Imperial or Princely State post by the late 1800s. Both public and private
correspondence was transported by them. Moreover, the provision of postal services was at
19

This is also true for many districts of British India. See Bogart and Chaudhary (2012) for a background
on Indian railways.
20
In earlier periods runners and couriers carried state correspondence. The postal system primarily served
the political needs of the state. The sparse evidence on private correspondence suggests couriers belonging
to specific castes transported private correspondence for a fee (Sood 2009). A detailed economic history of
the Indian post still remains to be written, but Bharat (2012) offers a first step towards understanding the
spread of the postal system in the colonial period.
21
Before the Imperial Post, there was no proper postal system in the Princely States except for the states
of Cochin, Travancore, and Mysore where state supported local posts had a long history dating to the 17th
century (Clarke 1921).
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the discretion of the ruler and his court, be it to allow the Imperial Post in the state or to
directly manage the postal network. The development of post offices was also not directly
related to literacy. Letters were written on behalf of others and read aloud when recipients
could not read. For example, according to Clark (1921), “It must not be supposed, however,
that the Post Office confines its energies to the literate population. It is largely used by
people who can neither read nor write, and this is made possible by the existence of professional letter-writers, who are to be found in every town and village in the country. For
a pice (farthing) they will write an address, and for two pice they will write a short letter
or a postcard or fill up a money order, though slightly higher fees are charged if the letter
is long” (p. 94). In our analysis, we construct an indicator variable for whether a Princely
State had one or more post offices. We do not focus on whether the post office came under
the Imperial Post or the state because both required the approval of the ruler.22
These histories suggest that Propositions 1 and 2 can be re-worded to formulate the
following testable predictions:
Prediction 1A (Private Good Effect on Literacy and Public Schools): Muslim rule should
have had a negative effect on public schools, public school enrollment, and Hindu
literacy but not on Muslim literacy, since Muslim religious institutions provided a
close substitute to public education.
Prediction 1B: (Private Good Effect on Railways and Post Offices): The religious identity
of the ruler should have had no effect on the presence of railways or post offices, since
neither was provided by the private sector.
Prediction 2 (Population Share Effect): Muslim rule should have had a positive effect
on Muslim literacy, Hindu literacy, public schools, public school enrollment, and the
presence of railways and post offices where the Muslim population share was greater.

5

Data

To test the predictions of the model, we collected data on the socio-economic characteristics
of the Princely States from official publications, individual histories of the State recorded in
the Imperial Gazetteer (Hunter et al., 1907) and secondary sources for the early 20th century.
Although there were over 600 Princely States in 1911, many were very small, consisting of
a few villages. The Indian census does not report individual data for smaller states, choosing instead to group these states and jointly report the information for a larger aggregate
22

The data also do not distinguish between the different types of post offices in the Princely States.
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unit. These smaller states with no individual data enjoyed less autonomy than their larger
neighbors and often came under the administrative oversight of neighboring British Indian
provinces. Thus, they were different from the states whose data were consistently reported
across the different sources. Our study focuses on 117 Princely States for which individual
data are uniformly reported in the census.23 These states account for almost 80 percent of
the population and 68 percent of the area covered by the Princely States.24 18 of the 117
states in our data set were ruled by Muslims.
We extracted information on total population, area in square miles, number of towns
and literates for each state in our sample from the 1911 Census of India (Government of
India, 1911). We chose 1911 as our year of analysis because a systematic enumeration of
literacy first began with the 1911 census. Although literacy was recorded in prior censuses,
it was measured in an inconsistent manner across regions. Moreover, the census claims there
was often an over-enumeration of literates in these earlier censuses. Beginning in 1911, the
census adopted a universal definition: any individual with the ability to read and write in
any language was counted as literate. An individual who could read a religious text but who
was unable to write was not counted as literate. Official discussions suggest the information
collected was of good quality.
Our model distinguishes between public goods that differ along religious lines, so in our
analysis we focus on Hindu and Muslim specific literacy. Since religion-specific literacy was
unreported in many Princely States of central and western India in 1911 (Central India
Agency States and Bombay States, respectively), we relied on information in 1901 and 1921
to construct estimates for 1911. For the Princely States of central India, we combined the
1901 Hindu and Muslim literacy rate in each state with the growth rate of Hindu and Muslim
literacy between 1901 and 1911 for larger administrative units to create an estimate of 1911
literacy. In a similar manner, we combined 1921 literacy with the growth rate between 1911
and 1921 to generate estimates of 1911 literacy for the Princely States in western India.25
Since these imputations may present biases based on unobservables, we also collected data
for Hindu and Muslim literacy in 1931. The 1931 census includes religion specific literacy
for a larger set of Princely States and hence there are no concerns of imputation.
23

We focus on a Princely State as our unit of observation. For some of the bigger states, the census reports
data for administrative units below the State. But we choose not to use these data because the variation of
the ruler is at the state level.
24
This calculation excludes the states and agencies in the North-West Frontier Province (in present day
Pakistan).
25
In some cases, literacy was only reported for a small group of states in those years, in which case we
assigned each state within the group the same value. These calculations are not without problems. There is
strong evidence of over-enumeration in the 1901 census and the influenza epidemic occurred in 1917 raising
concerns about the 1911-1921 calculation for the western Indian states.
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We also used the census to construct measures of the population share of Hindus, Muslims, and other religious groups (an aggregated category including Buddhists, Jains, Parsis,
Sikhs, and tribal groups). Using the Atlas Map of India (Census of India 2011), we constructed a dummy for coastal states. Most Princely States were located in the interior of
the country because of the nature of direct colonial expansion along the coast, but a few
states in western India bordered the coast.
To capture institutional features of Princely States, we read their individual histories in
the Imperial Gazetteer and created four variables. First, we recorded an indicator variable
for whether the ruler or his family at the time of the state’s founding was connected to
the local population. This was based on our reading of the history and may be subject to
some error. Larger states are described in more detail in the Imperial Gazetteer and were
easier to code in general. We only coded rulers as having no historical tie if the history
unambiguously indicated that the founding family was non-local to the state population.26
Second, we created an indicator variable for states that were reprimanded by the GOI
for mis-management of their public finances or if they experienced an intervention by the
GOI in their local affairs. Our reading suggests the GOI was more likely to reprimand or
intervene in larger and more important states. It could be that the Imperial Gazetteer did
not record such interventions for smaller states, but our sense is the British were generally
more concerned about the bigger states.
The Gazetteer also records the number of public schools and enrollment or average daily
attendance in these schools for many states as of 1903-04. In few cases the history only
notes the number of schools, or the number of pupils. We extracted the information on
public, i.e., state run schools and students, or those receiving subsidies from the state. In
general the histories suggest many schools were supported by the state. If private schools
were significant in the state, the history also described the provision of private schooling.
However, it is unclear if Muslim religious schools connected to mosques are counted in the
enumeration of private schools. Our reading suggests they are not always counted. Unlike
British India, private schools were less common in the Princely States and they seemed to
have a presence in larger states such as Baroda, Cochin, Hyderabad, Mysore, and Travancore.
Other than the Imperial Gazetteer, we are unaware of any historical sources with schooling
data for a large sample of Princely States.
To measure the provision of railways, we used the 1911 Administration Report on Rail26

This coding creates problems for Maratha successor states such as Indore, Gwalior and Baroda. We
chose to code these states as having no historical ties because they represent successor states of the Maratha
Empire at the time of founding although clearly by the early 20th century their rulers would be viewed as
strongly tied to the population. We did this to be consistent across Hindu and Muslim states in the coding.
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ways. Based on the history of each railway, we constructed an indicator for railway ownership. We coded this variable as one only if a Princely State explicitly owned any portion
of a railway line passing through its territory. States with railways that were wholly owned
by the GOI or a private company were coded as zero. We also collected information on
total mileage, capital expenditures, gauge, and operations. The post office data are from
the annual Post Office Guide for 1911. Again, we created an indicator for whether a state
had one or more post offices in their territory.27
We coded the religion of the Princely State ruler using Iyer (2010). For states that
were unreported in Iyer (2010), we used The Native States of India (Chakrabarti 1895).
The religion of the ruler in the latter publication is reported as of 1890, but there is no
significant variation in this variable over time. In general, members of the same family ruled
these states for decades. We also used The Native States of India to collect information on
tax revenues as of 1890 and the number of gun salutes received by the ruler.
We coded the year the state was founded using individual state histories described on
an online website.28 Using this information, we constructed an indicator for whether the
state was founded prior to or after the end of Aurangzeb’s reign in 1707, which is commonly
viewed as the beginning of the decline of the Mughal Empire. States that emerged in the
aftermath of the decline of Mughal rule may have differed from older states for many reasons.
Older states may have had enduring institutional structures in place and were perhaps less
likely to adopt the institutional practices of the Mughal Empire. It is also possible these
states were more economically and politically powerful than states founded in the wake of
Mughal collapse.
The decline of Mughal rule may have also independently influenced the trajectory of
economic development in the Princely States. For example, areas where Mughal rule declined earlier may have weaker Muslim religious authorities and less emphasis on religious
instruction for Muslims. This could be independent of subsequent Muslim rule in the region. Many areas that went on to become independent Princely States were under Mughal
rule in the 16th and 17th century. To capture the decline of Mughal rule, we coded states
based on whether Mughal rule declined before 1765, between 1765 and 1805, and after 1805.
27

Sheetal Bharat generously shared her data on post office provision that was compiled using the Post
Office Guide (Bharat 2012). We used these data to construct our measure. Although the data are detailed
enough to allow a count of the number of post offices in each state, we are hesitant to use this intensive
measure because the data sources are unclear whether they encompass all the post offices in each Princely
State.
28
This website (princelystatesofindia.com) was recently taken down. In our analysis, we only use a dummy
for whether the state was founded pre- or post-1707. This information is easy to verify in the Imperial
Gazetteer of India (Hunter et al., 1907).
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Following the Battle of Plassey, Bengal and Bihar came under the rule of the East India
Company. Mughal rule also collapsed in the northern and eastern parts of India before 1765
as large areas came under the rule of the Marathas. In the next wave, Mughal rule collapsed
in Madras, Orissa, Punjab, and the United Provinces. While most of these territories went
to the East India Company, some went on to become Sikh Princely States in the north.
This information is coded based on a map in Robinson (1982). As seen in the map, there
is limited variation in these indicators for Princely States within the same region unlike for
British India (figure 2).
Given the historical variation within Princely States, we believe focusing on local comparisons is very important. Comparing the Muslim state of Hyderabad in peninsula India
to the northern Hindu state of Jammu and Kashmir is an apples to oranges comparison.
Hence, we code six regions of the Princely States. These are the Rajputana States in northwest; the Punjab States plus Jammu and Kashmir in the north; the Central India Agency
States; Bombay and Western India Agency states in the west; Rampur and Tehri Garhwal
in the United Provinces; Cochin, Travancore, Mysore, Hyderabad and two smaller states in
the south; and finally the states of Cooch Behar, Hill Tipperah and Manipur in the east.
Table 1 presents summary statistics by religion of the ruler (Muslim and non-Muslim).
There are no statistically significant differences in the means of the dependent variables of interest (Hindu and Muslim literacy, schools, railways and post offices) between Muslim ruled
and non-Muslim ruled states. Muslim-ruled states were more likely to be coastal because of
the Muslim-ruled states in western India bordering the sea (see Figure 1). They were also
more likely to be founded during the decline of the Mughal Empire (after 1707) and have
fewer rulers with historical ties to the state at the time of founding. There are no significant
differences in the number of gun salutes or intervention by the colonial government. There
were more Muslims on average in Muslim-ruled states: the Muslim population averaged 22%
in Muslim-ruled states versus 9% in non-Muslim states. These averages mask incredible heterogeneity across states. For example, Muslim-ruled states such as Hyderabad (10.3%) and
Bhopal (11.2%) had relatively small Muslim populations compared to Malerkotla (36.5%)
or Rampur (46.0%). Likewise, non-Muslim ruled states varied from very low Muslim populations in Tehri Garhwal (0.6%) and Rewah (2.2%) to large Muslim populations in Jammu
and Kashmir (75.5%) and Cooch Behar (30.8%).
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6

Identifying the Effects of Muslim Rule

The theoretical model illustrates how Muslim rule may affect public good provision. First, if
the public good in question is also provided by the private sector, then Muslim rule directly
effects public good provision, with the direction of the effect depending on the degree to
which Muslims benefit from the private good (Private Good Effect). Second, Muslim rule
may have a positive effect on public good provision in states with a larger share of Muslims
(Population Share Effect).
We use the provision of public goods and literacy to test the predictions of the model.
We estimate a cross-sectional regression for each Princely State i in region j. Our dependent
variables are the Muslim literacy rate, Hindu literacy rate, the number of public schools,
school enrollment, an indicator for railway provision, and an indicator for post office provision. The primary independent variables of concern are an indicator variable for whether
the state had a Muslim ruler and the interaction of this variable with the Muslim population
share. Thus, our estimating equation takes the following reduced form:

yij = α + β1 M uslimRulerij + β2 M uslimRulerij ∗ F ractionM uslimij + γXij + δ j + εij (4)
The vector Xij includes characteristics of Princely States that may jointly influence the
religion of the ruler and public goods. These include the number of towns divided by area (a
proxy for urbanization), an indicator for coastal districts, the log of state revenues divided
by area (primarily land tax revenues), the area of the state, Muslim population share, and
the population share of other religions (non-Hindu and non-Muslim). In the case of schools
and pupils, we cannot include towns or the religious population shares because they are
measured as of 1911 while the schooling data is for 1903-04.
We also explore the effects of institutional variables; namely, whether the state was
founded after the decline of Mughal rule (in 1707); the number of gun salutes recevied by
the state (a measure of their importance to the GOI); whether the founding family of the
state had strong historical ties to the region; whether the state was reprimanded or faced
an intervention by the GOI; and indicators for the differential decline of Mughal rule. We
include region fixed effects captured by δj in all the regressions so that we focus on local
comparisons. There is sufficient variation in the data to include region fixed effects because
Muslim-ruled states were spread all over India (see Figure 1).
The main econometric challenge in this set up is the differential selection of Princely
States to Muslim rule. As noted earlier, many Muslim-ruled states emerged in the aftermath
of the decline of the Mughal Empire and were ruled by former members of the Mughal army
21

or nobility. Muslim rulers were not always related to the local population and in some cases
received the land that they went on to rule from the Marathas (Hindus). This suggests
an element of randomness in the assignment of Muslim rule. Yet, selection concerns still
remain. To address the possibility of differential selection, we rely on matching techniques
using inverse probability matching weights. The idea underlying matching is an apples-toapples comparison by using similar treatment and control groups to generate an estimate of
the treatment effect.29
In our context, the treatment is the religion of the ruler, i.e., Muslim ruler and the control
is non-Muslim ruler. We use the following key observable variables to generate comparable
groups of Muslim and non-Muslim ruled states: the area of the state, an indicator for
coastal location, an indicator for whether the state was founded after 1707 (Aurangzeb’s
death), and region fixed effects. By giving more weight to observationally similar treatment
and control groups, the matching estimator provides a cleaner measure of the treatment of
Muslim rule, provided no significant unobservable factors are driving selection into Muslim
rule. Ideally, we want to compare the state under Muslim rule to the same state under Hindu
rule. Since this is not feasible in our context, matching offers the next best alternative by
comparing states under Muslim rule to states under Hindu rule that share similar observable
characteristics.
To generate matching estimates, we rely on the inverse probability matching technique.30
Most matching estimations compare outcomes for matched treatment and control groups,
rather than test for differential effects of treatment. We follow this approach and restrict
the matching analysis to comparisons of our key outcome variables between Muslim and
non-Muslim ruled states. We do not test for differential effects using matching, which is
non-standard using these techniques. To implement matching we run a first stage regression
with Muslim Ruler as a dependent variable on an indicator for coastal states, area of the
state, indicator for post-1707 founding and region fixed effects. We predict the residual and
generate weights based on the residual. These inverse probability weights are defined as
1/residual for Muslim ruled states, and 1/(1-residual) for non-Muslim ruled states. In the
second stage we use the inverse probability weights to run a weighted (i.e., matched) OLS
regression.
The institutional setup has to satisfy two assumptions for matching to be a valid estima29

Matching estimates are commonly used in the program evaluation literature. Participants are assigned
to a treatment (e.g., a job training program). Their wage or other outcomes after program participation
are compared to a matched group of similar non participants to generate the causal effect of the treatment.
Imbens and Rubin (2015) provide an overview of matching methods.
30
Our results are robust to other propensity score techniques such as nearest neighbor matching.
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tion strategy. First, there needs to be a sufficiently large group of Hindu states that share
similar observables to Muslim states (the common support assumption). This assumption is
valid in our context because we observe both Hindu and Muslim ruled states of comparable
area, adjoining the coast, founded after 1707, and situated in the same region. Figures 3
and 4 both show the areas of overlap between the Muslim and non-Muslim states using
histograms and kernel density graphs of our first stage residuals. If the two graphs did not
overlap in Figure 4, it would suggest we had insufficient common support to identify the
impact of Muslim rulers.
Second, we assume in such a matching set-up that selection into Muslim rule is primarily
driven by observable factors. One justification for this assumption is that many conquest
states were established by Hindu and Muslim mercenaries after 1707 in western and central
India. After accounting for size, post-1707 founding (i.e., conquest state), region, and proximity to the coast, any unobservable factors influencing Muslim rule are probably of small
magnitude and unlikely to bias the coefficients in a significant manner. Matching provides
an alternate estimate of Muslim rule, one that is more robust to selection bias compared to
the cross-sectional OLS estimates.

7

Results

We report results on literacy in 1911 and 1931 in Tables 2 and 3. Columns 1-3 suggest there
was a negative but insignificant impact of Muslim rulers on total literacy in 1911. The signs
on the socio-economic variables are as we would expect. More urbanized states near the
coast have higher literacy. Younger states have lower literacy (Founded Post-1707), while
the number of gun salutes has a positive impact.
The more interesting results emerge when look at religion-specific literacy. We find
the coefficient on Muslim Ruler (β1 ) is negative and statistically significant in the Hindu
literacy regressions but not in the Muslim literacy regression. This result lends support to
the saliency of the Private Goods Effect. Average Hindu literacy in states with Muslim rulers
is 2.3 percentage points lower than in states with non-Muslim rulers. This is far from a trivial
difference, as Hindu literacy averaged only 4.3 percent in the Princely States. Columns 5
and 7 include the interaction between Muslim Ruler and Fraction Muslim (β2 ), allowing
us to test the saliency of the Population Share Effect. The coefficient on the interaction
is positive but statistically insignificant. Meanwhile, the coefficient on Muslim Ruler (β1 )
remains large, negative, and statistically significant in the Hindu literacy regression but not
the Muslim literacy regression where the coefficient is smaller in magnitude and statistically
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insignificant.31 Most of the institutional variables are small in magnitude and insignificant,
possibly due to limited variation in these variables within regions.
Table 3 presents the results for Hindu and Muslim literacy in 1931. The results on
Muslim ruler are remarkably similar after controlling for differences between states. Hindu
literacy is 2.8 percentage points lower in states with Muslim rulers (Column 3). Since Hindu
literacy increased during this period, the economic significance of the coefficient is slightly
smaller than in 1911. Again, we find no significant effect of Muslim ruler on Muslim literacy
(columns 4-6). The 1931 results indicate that our findings on Muslim ruler in Table 2 are
not driven by data imputations for 1911 religion-specific literacy. In terms of our model,
the results support the saliency of the Private Goods Effect but only weakly support the
saliency of the Population Share Effect.
We explore the impact of Muslim rulers on public schools and enrollment in Table 4.
Our sample size decreases slightly in these regressions because the information was not
consistently reported in the Imperial Gazetteer. In principle the number of schools and
enrollment should be standardized by population but our population data is for 1911 while
our education data is of 1903/04. Hence, we choose to report the results for the number of
schools and pupils.32 Our results are not precisely estimated for schools, but they confirm a
negative impact of Muslim ruler on the number of public schools. We also observe a negative
and statistically significant impact of Muslim ruler on enrollment. Since Muslim ruled states
were larger on average, this finding on enrollment in not capturing differences in the area
and population between the two types of states. Overall, the findings on schools and pupils
support the idea that Muslim ruled Princely States had less public schooling.
Although the results highlight the negative impact of Muslim rulers on education, one
may be concerned that Muslim ruled states were poorer on average with less money to
support public education. This is unlikely because the revenue per area was higher for
Muslim ruled states, but it could be that revenues in this context are an imperfect proxy
for income. In Table 5 we study the provision of post offices and railways. These public
goods provide an additional test for income differences. Railways in particular were an
expensive infrastructure investment. States without the resources were unlikely to embark
on a program of railway development. As expected in Table 5 we find that revenues are a
significant determinant of whether Princely States invested in railways as are the number
31

The results are robust to using weighted OLS (weighted by population), dropping outlier states (in
terms of population), and including an additional control to capture religious fragmentation in the state.
32
Our results are similar if we use the 1911 population but since that is not the correct way to standardize
we choose not to report those results. The 1901 Census does not report population for the same set of states
as the 1911 Census.
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of gun salutes, another measure of the stature of the state. We find no significant impact
of Muslim ruler (β1 ) on railways or post offices. The coefficient is positive but insignificant
for post offices, and negative and insignificant for railways. This suggests again that income
differences between Muslim and non-Muslim ruled states are not driving our results. Overall,
the results in Table 5 indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the Private Goods
Effect is salient, as it predicts that the ruler’s identity should have no effect on the provision
of pure public goods that are not provided by the private sector. In Columns 3 and 6 of
Table 5, we report regressions with the interaction term (β2 ) in order to test the Population
Share Effect. This coefficient is statistically insignificant across both specifications.
Owning a railway is a crude measure of provision because railways differed on many
dimensions such as gauge and operations. We use information reported in the 1911 Administration Report on Railways to test for differences between Muslim and Non-Muslim states
on other railway metrics. Table 6 presents the results. Indian Railways were built on a
standard, 5 feet 6 inch gauge, a meter gauge of 3 feet 3 83 inch, or a narrow gauge of around
2 feet. Standard gauge railways were the most expensive but could also transport heavier
wagons and traffic. We observe no significant differences in total mileage or mileage under
specific gauges between Muslim and non-Muslim states. In fact, average total mileage is
remarkably similar at 111 miles for Muslim rulers and 117 for non-Muslim rulers. Capital
per mile is higher on average in Muslim ruled states but the difference is insignificant. On
the operations side, we observe no statistically significant differences by the religion of the
ruler on whether railways were operated by the GOI, a private company, or Princely State.
Given the potential selection bias of Muslim Rulers, we present results using inverse
probability matching in Table 7. These estimates support the findings of our cross-sectional
regressions. The estimates on 1911 and 1931 Muslim literacy and railways are all statistically
insignificant, while the estimate of Muslim Ruler (β1 ) on 1911 and 1931 Hindu literacy is
negative, and statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficients on Muslim Ruler
are remarkably similar for 1911 and 1931 at 2.9 percentage points and 3.0 percentage points
respectively. Interestingly we find a large and positive impact of Muslim rulers on the
provision of post offices in these matched comparisons. We are uncertain as to what is
driving this result, but it does suggest public good provision was not universally lower in
Muslim-ruled states. As in the OLS regressions, the findings on schools and pupils are
negative in Table 7, but insignificant.
In sum, these results provide strong evidence in support of the Private Goods Effect,
but very weak support for the Population Share Effect. We recognize there could be other
explanations for these results. The first explanation that comes to mind is one of patronage.
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Muslims were less likely to support public education for Hindus because there was no direct
fiscal benefit to them of extending such education. Income taxes were low if not absent
in most Princely States and rulers could not recuperate fiscal investments in schools. In
contrast, rulers may have invested in the education of their co-religionists if they were more
likely to hire administrators and ministers from this group. This simple patronage story
would suggest a negative impact of Muslim rulers on Hindu literacy and a positive impact
on Muslim literacy. However, we only find a negative impact on Hindu literacy. More importantly, administrators in many states were outsiders and did not share the religion of
the ruler. According to historian Barbara Ramusack (2004), the two most common groups
of princely state administrators in the northern states were English-educated Bengalis and
Kashmiri brahman pandits: “Western-educated Bengalis, generally bhadralok or respectable
people and more particularly kayasthas had followed British armies and administrators into
newly annexed areas of Punjab, Awadh and Rajput states” (p. 183). Similarly, the Kashmiri
pandits fluent in both Persian and English were prominent in Patiala, Indore and Gwalior.
Such outside ministers were actively encouraged by the British (Ramusack 2004). As mentioned earlier there was no strong religious element to administrator either. Against this
backdrop we believe our findings are not a function of pure state patronage to support public
administration.
Another explanation, not mutually exclusive from our theoretical mechanism, relates to
selection into Islam. It could be the case that non-Muslims were more likely to convert
to Islam in Muslim ruled states to court favor and patronage. Again, it is unclear what
form this favor and patronage took because public services such as railways and post offices
were available to all religions. More importantly, if there was positive selection into Islam
we would expect both a positive coefficient on Muslim literacy and a negative coefficient on
Hindu literacy. According to discussions on religion in the Census of India, forced conversions
were not common in the 19th and 20th century as compared to centuries past before the
arrival of the British. They also suggest more converts to Islam in this time were from the
lowest Hindu castes. In this discussion about western India, the Census had the following
to say:
Along the coast the religion was brought by traders from Arabia and Persia, in
Gujarat and the Deccan, as far south as Bijapur, by invading armies from Delhi,
and in the extreme south of the Presidency many Jains were forcibly converted by
Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan. In Sind the aboriginal tribes became Muhammadan
from the time of Arab conquest and under the rule of the Kalhora and Talpur
Kings. Now the age of compulsory conversions is over and the proselytizing zeal
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of Islam a thing of the past; though the religion of Muhammad still obtains
converts they are a neglible number and drawn from the lowest Hindu castes,
who seek thereby to improve their social status (Census of India 1911, p. 68).
While we cannot quantitatively rule out these competing explanations, we believe our
hypothesis is an important link from Muslim rulers to Hindu literacy for two reasons. First,
it is derived using a straight-forward model with minimal and standard assumptions on
human behavior. Second, it explains why ruler identity matters in some contexts (i.e., when
substitute goods are privately provided) but not others. An alternative hypothesis would
have to explain why Muslim rule is bad for Hindu literacy but not bad (or good) for other
types of public good provision.

8

Conclusion

This paper provides a theory of how a ruler’s religious identity affects the provision of public
goods. A simple model suggests that there are two possible causal pathways. First, a ruler
may provide more public goods when a greater portion of his subjects are co-religionists. Second, rulers may provide less of a public good if the private sector provides his co-religionists
with a substitute good that is excludable by religion (e.g., religious education).
In order to test these hypotheses, we exploit a newly constructed data set on the Indian
Princely States for the early 20th century. Using data on religion-specific literacy, schools,
school enrollment, railway ownership, and post office provision, we find support for the
second, but not the first, of these hypotheses. In particular, we find that Hindu literacy,
schools, and enrollment - but not Muslim literacy, railway ownership, or post office provision
- are negatively affected by the presence of Muslim rule. This result is consistent with our
hypothesis, since private Muslim schools were prevalent and it follows that Muslim rulers
would have less incentive to spend money on public primary education.
These results suggest that there is nothing about religious doctrine per se that affects
public good provision. This insight provides a twist on the Weberian connection between
religion and economic outcomes. It suggests that while the role of doctrine should not
necessarily be ignored, religious identity can play an important role in affecting economic
outcomes regardless of the content of religion.
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Figure 1: Map of British India and Princely States, 1911
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Figure 2: Collapse of Muslim Rule in India
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Figure 3: Histogram of Residuals by Muslim Ruler

Figure 4: Kernel Density of Residual by Muslim Ruler
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Non-Muslim Ruler
Mean
SD

Muslim Ruler
Mean
SD

Outcomes
Literacy Rate, 1911
Muslim Literacy Rate, 1911
Hindu Literacy Rate, 1911

4.2%
6.3%
4.3%

3.4%
5.2%
2.8%

4.6%
6.2%
3.7%

3.0%
4.2%
2.9%

-0.003
0.001
0.006

Muslim Literacy Rate, 1931
Hindu Literacy Rate, 1931

9.2%
5.7%

6.7%
4.5%

8.4%
5.0%

5.3%
3.4%

0.008
0.007

Public Schools (1903/04)
Pupils (1903/04)
Railway Ownership (0/1)
Post Office (0/1)

97.8
4,720
25.3%
54.5%

269.7
14,495
43.7%
50.0%

95.4
7,314
38.9%
38.9%

208.0
17,057
50.2%
50.2%

2.4
-2594
-0.136
0.157

Socio-Economic
Fraction Muslim
Fraction Other
Towns/Area
Revenues/Area
Area
Coastal (0/1)

8.9%
10.5%
0.002
551
3,531
9.1%

11.0%
19.4%
0.004
523
8,715
28.9%

22.1%
5.4%
0.004
777
6,468
27.8%

18.2%
9.4%
0.005
125
19,375
46.1%

-0.132**
0.050
-0.002
-225.7*
-2,936
-0.187*

Institutional
Founded Post-1707 (0/1)
# Gun Salutes
Rulers w/ Historical Ties to State (0/1)
Reprimand/Intervention by GOI (01/1)
Post 1805 Collapse of Mughal Rule (0/1)
1765-1805 Collapse of Mughal Rule (0/1)

46.5%
9.4
90.9%
28.3%
2.0%
12.1%

50.1%
6.8
28.9%
45.3%
14.1%
32.8%

83.3%
7.9
44.4%
27.8%
11.1%
22.2%

38.3%
7.8
51.1%
46.1%
32.3%
42.8%

-0.369**
1.5
0.465**
0.005
-0.091
-0.101

Observations

99

Note: See text for sources and details. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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TABLE 2: EFFECT OF MUSLIM RULE ON LITERACY RATES, 1911
(1)
Muslim Ruler (β1)
Fraction Muslim
Fraction Other
Towns/Area
Ln-Revenue/Area
Area
Coastal (0/1)

Total Literacy
(2)

Hindu Literacy
(4)
(5)

Muslim Literacy
(6)
(7)

-0.015***
[0.006]
0.042**
[0.017]
0.006
[0.009]
0.812
[0.510]
0.004*
[0.002]
-0.000*
[0.000]
0.045***
[0.010]

-0.007
[0.007]
0.040**
[0.018]
0.000
[0.008]
1.404***
[0.490]
0.003
[0.002]
-0.000**
[0.000]
0.037***
[0.010]
-0.011**
[0.005]
0.001***
[0.000]
0.001
[0.006]
0.005
[0.005]
-0.011
[0.009]
-0.005
[0.008]

-0.001
[0.009]
0.052**
[0.025]
-0.001
[0.008]
1.377***
[0.500]
0.002
[0.002]
-0.000**
[0.000]
0.037***
[0.011]
-0.011**
[0.005]
0.001**
[0.000]
0.001
[0.006]
0.006
[0.005]
-0.014
[0.011]
-0.007
[0.009]
-0.031
[0.032]

-0.023***
[0.008]
0.103***
[0.019]
0.013
[0.008]
0.073
[0.405]
0.001
[0.002]
-0.000**
[0.000]
0.020**
[0.008]
-0.005
[0.004]
0.000
[0.000]
-0.007
[0.006]
0.005
[0.004]
-0.014
[0.015]
-0.018*
[0.011]

-0.030***
[0.009]
0.088***
[0.022]
0.014*
[0.008]
0.107
[0.411]
0.001
[0.002]
-0.000*
[0.000]
0.020**
[0.008]
-0.005
[0.004]
0.000
[0.000]
-0.007
[0.006]
0.004
[0.004]
-0.011
[0.016]
-0.016
[0.011]
0.038
[0.029]

0.010
[0.016]
-0.040
[0.032]
0.037*
[0.020]
-2.049*
[1.099]
0.002
[0.003]
-0.000*
[0.000]
0.013
[0.025]
-0.016*
[0.008]
0.000
[0.001]
0.002
[0.012]
0.002
[0.007]
0.041
[0.033]
-0.022
[0.014]

-0.002
[0.022]
-0.065
[0.048]
0.038*
[0.020]
-1.988*
[1.106]
0.002
[0.004]
-0.000*
[0.000]
0.014
[0.025]
-0.015*
[0.008]
0.000
[0.001]
0.002
[0.012]
0.001
[0.007]
0.046
[0.036]
-0.019
[0.014]
0.063
[0.058]

116
0.584

116
0.634

116
0.636

106
0.748

106
0.753

105
0.548

105
0.551

Founded Post 1707
(0/1)
# Gun Salutes
Rulers w/ Historical
Ties to State (0/1)
Reprimand/Interventio
n by GOI (01/1)
Post 1805 Collapse of
Mughal Rule (0/1)
1765-1805 Collapse of
Mughal Rule (0/1)
Muslim Ruler *
Fraction Muslim (β2)
Observations
R-squared

(3)

Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All the regressions include region fixed effects.

TABLE 3: EFFECT OF MUSLIM RULE ON LITERACY RATES, 1931
(1)
Muslim Ruler (β1)
Fraction Muslim
Fraction Other
Towns/Area
Ln-Revenue/Area
Area
Coastal (0/1)

Hindu Literacy
(2)

(4)

Muslim Literacy
(5)

(6)

-0.037***
[0.007]
0.098***
[0.023]
0.033
[0.022]
1.315**
[0.633]
0.006**
[0.003]
-0.000
[0.000]
0.054***
[0.012]

-0.031***
[0.010]
0.086***
[0.025]
0.023
[0.020]
2.092***
[0.579]
0.003
[0.002]
-0.000
[0.000]
0.046***
[0.012]
0.000
[0.006]
0.001***
[0.001]
-0.002
[0.012]
0.005
[0.006]
-0.021
[0.014]
-0.019
[0.015]

-0.028**
[0.014]
0.091**
[0.036]
0.023
[0.020]
2.079***
[0.588]
0.003
[0.003]
-0.000
[0.000]
0.046***
[0.012]
0.000
[0.006]
0.001**
[0.001]
-0.002
[0.012]
0.005
[0.006]
-0.022
[0.016]
-0.020
[0.017]
-0.014
[0.051]

0.000
[0.011]
-0.083**
[0.040]
0.086***
[0.031]
-3.676**
[1.493]
0.010*
[0.005]
0.000
[0.000]
0.003
[0.020]

0.007
[0.017]
-0.087**
[0.035]
0.080**
[0.032]
-2.944**
[1.431]
0.009*
[0.005]
-0.000
[0.000]
-0.004
[0.022]
-0.021*
[0.013]
0.000
[0.001]
-0.006
[0.018]
0.020*
[0.012]
0.006
[0.019]
-0.034**
[0.014]

-0.006
[0.022]
-0.115**
[0.049]
0.082**
[0.033]
-2.869*
[1.448]
0.009*
[0.005]
-0.000
[0.000]
-0.002
[0.022]
-0.020
[0.013]
0.001
[0.001]
-0.005
[0.018]
0.019
[0.012]
0.012
[0.021]
-0.030**
[0.013]
0.071
[0.056]

114
0.578

114
0.623

114
0.623

113
0.437

113
0.483

113
0.486

Founded Post 1707 (0/1)
# Gun Salutes
Rulers w/ Historical Ties
to State (0/1)
Reprimand/Intervention
by GOI (01/1)
Post 1805 Collapse of
Mughal Rule (0/1)
1765-1805 Collapse of
Mughal Rule (0/1)
Muslim Ruler *
Fraction Muslim (β2)
Observations
R-squared

(3)

Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All the regressions include region fixed effects.

TABLE 4: EFFECT OF MUSLIM RULE ON SCHOOLS AND PUPILS, 1903/04
(1)
Muslim Ruler (β1)

Schools
(2)

(4)

Pupils
(5)

(6)

-12
[38]

-79*
[47]
36**
[17]
0.006*
[0.004]
166*
[97]

-71
[52]
17
[13]
0.003
[0.003]
101
[88]
-8
[33]
11***
[4]
-107
[78]
55
[40]
-74
[132]
-144
[121]

-493
[2,554]

-5,288*
[2,904]
1,292**
[517]
0.244
[0.192]
10,439*
[5,335]

-5,076*
[2,903]
1,008
[740]
0.229
[0.160]
9,007*
[5,329]
1,558
[1,885]
295***
[88]
708
[1,401]
505
[2,002]
-2,405
[7,416]
-239
[1,962]

98
0.435

98
0.513

98
0.614

81
0.642

81
0.702

81
0.716

Ln-Revenue/Area
Area
Coastal (0/1)
Founded Post 1707 (0/1)
# Gun Salutes
Rulers w/ Historical Ties to
State (0/1)
Reprimand/Intervention by
GOI (01/1)
Post 1805 Collapse of
Mughal Rule (0/1)
1765-1805 Collapse of
Mughal Rule (0/1)
Observations
R-squared

(3)

Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All the regressions include region fixed effects.

TABLE 5: EFFECT OF MUSLIM RULE ON RAILWAY AND POST OFFICE PROVISION
(1)
Muslim Ruler (β1)
Fraction Muslim
Fraction Other
Towns/Area
Ln-Revenue/Area
Area
Coastal (0/1)

Post Office (0/1)
(2)

-0.066
[0.117]
0.186
[0.337]
0.598**
[0.274]
-1.959
[7.598]
0.026
[0.035]
0.000**
[0.000]
-0.014
[0.108]

0.151
[0.110]
0.050
[0.296]
0.453*
[0.251]
14.196*
[7.180]
-0.020
[0.034]
0.000
[0.000]
-0.217**
[0.098]
-0.169**
[0.077]
0.031***
[0.006]
0.094
[0.110]
0.109
[0.075]
-0.428
[0.357]
-0.089
[0.132]

117
0.451

117
0.591

Founded Post 1707 (0/1)
# Gun Salutes
Rulers w/ Historical Ties
to State (0/1)
Reprimand/Intervention
by GOI (01/1)
Post 1805 Collapse of
Mughal Rule (0/1)
1765-1805 Collapse of
Muslim Rule (0/1)
Muslim Ruler *
Fraction Muslim (β2)
Observations
R-squared

(3)

0.036
-0.003
0.040
[0.143]
[0.136]
[0.151]
-0.183
-0.194
-0.184
[0.374]
[0.287]
[0.311]
0.465*
0.383**
0.280
[0.249]
[0.163]
[0.171]
14.717* -24.291*** -15.419**
[7.419]
[8.189]
[6.845]
-0.014
0.127***
0.084**
[0.034]
[0.033]
[0.035]
0.000
0.000***
0.000**
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
-0.203** 0.409***
0.300**
[0.102]
[0.148]
[0.146]
-0.164**
0.017
[0.078]
[0.070]
0.031***
0.023***
[0.006]
[0.006]
0.095
-0.022
[0.108]
[0.119]
0.100
-0.007
[0.075]
[0.082]
-0.368
-0.103
[0.367]
[0.373]
-0.056
0.105
[0.134]
[0.164]
0.610
[0.429]
117
0.595

Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All the regressions include region fixed effects.

Railway Ownership (0/1)
(4)
(5)
(6)

117
0.421

117
0.502

-0.041
[0.198]
-0.348
[0.408]
0.288
[0.174]
-15.054**
[6.864]
0.088**
[0.037]
0.000**
[0.000]
0.309**
[0.147]
0.021
[0.070]
0.023***
[0.006]
-0.022
[0.118]
-0.013
[0.083]
-0.061
[0.384]
0.129
[0.175]
0.428
[0.605]
117
0.504

TABLE 6: Comparison of Railways in 1911
Muslim Ruler
Non-Muslim Ruler
Mileage
Mileage: Standard Gauge
Mileage: Metre Gauge
Mileage/Area
Capital/Mile (in Rupees)

Year of First Opening
Organization
Worked by Government of India
Worked by Private Company
Worked by Princely State

Observations

t-statistic

111
(77.45)
51.76
(35.80)
59.25
(43.55)
0.019
(0.01)
59,773
(9076)

117
(28.57)
17.17
(9.18)
97.02
(34.94)
0.027
(0.01)
51,470
(6802)

1893
(4)

1896
(2)

0.640

0.22
(0.15)
0.56
(0.18)
0.22
(0.15)

0.14
(0.07)
0.43
(0.10)
0.43
(0.10)

-0.491

9

28

Notes: Administration Report of the Railways in India 1911, standard deviation in brackets.

0.078
-0.936
0.676
0.939
-0.732

-0.635
1.178

TABLE 7: INVERSE PROBABILITY MATCHING
1911 Literacy
Hindu
Muslim
Muslim Ruler (β1)

Observations

R-squared

-0.029***
[0.007]

-0.004
[0.013]

1931 Literacy
Hindu
Muslim
-0.030***
[0.010]

Railway

Post Office

Schools

Pupils

-0.015
[0.014]

0.177
[0.118]

0.200**
[0.093]

-52
[50]

-1,463
[1,155]

117
0.526

117

0.594

98
0.644

81
0.767

106

105

114

113

0.689

0.753

0.567

0.665

Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All the regressions include region fixed effects, and the same set of controls as in specifications 3 and 6 for literacy, railways, post offices schools and pupils in Tables35 respectively.

State

Balasinor
Cambay

Jafrabad

Janjira

Junagadh
Palanpur
Radhanpur
Savanur
Khairpur
Baoni
Bhopal
Jaora
Banganpalle
Bahawalpur
Dujana
Loharu
Malerkotla
Patuadi
Tonk
Hyderabad
Rampur

APPENDIX TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF THE FOUNDING OF MUSLIM PRINCELY STATES
Founding of State
The ruling family descends from Sher Khan Babi (Babi Dynasty), a distinguished Mughal officer. When Mughal rule declined he successfully overthrew the Mughal governor around
1735 and established his independent state. On the death of his son, Salabat Khan, the territory was divided with Junagadh going to the younger son of Salabat Khan and Balasinor to the
older son.
Bombay
The ruling family descends from Momin Khan, one of the last Mughal governors of Gujarat. The state was established during the decline of the Mughal Empire around 1730.
Bombay
The state became independent under local authority in 1736 when Mughal rule declined in this region. The locals took to piracy and were ousted by the Nawab of Janjira. The state was
sold to a Sunni Muslim of Abyssinian descent in 1759, but he was unable to control the state. It was transferred to the Nawab of Janjira, who sent the former ruler to serve as his
governor. It is a dependent state of Janjira.
Bombay
Muslim rule in this predates the Mughal Empire and is of foreign origin. The Abyssinians (working for the Nizam Shahi kings of Ahmedabad) established their control over Janjira in
1489, it became a part of Bijapur State but remained under local Abyssinian rule. The state allied with the Mughal Empire and was never ruled by the Marathas despite numerous
attempts. (Many Abyssinians were brought as slaves by the Portuguese from Africa and converted to Islam in India. They often worked as mercenaries for local rulers.)
Bombay
The ruling family descends from Sher Khan Babi (Babi Dynasty), a distinguished Mughal officer. When Mughal rule declined he successfully overthrew the Mughal governor around
1735 and established his independent state. On the death of his son, Salabat Khan, the territory was divided with Junagadh going to the younger son of Salabat Khan and Balasinor to the
older son.
Bombay
The founders belonged to the Lohani Afghan Dynasty. They came to rule the state during the decline of the Mughal Empire, but were attacked by the Marathas. They were able to protect
themselves from the Marathas with help from the East India Company.
Bombay
The ruling family descends from the Babi Dynasty (see Balasinor and Junagadh). The state emerged under independent rule following the decline of the Mughal Empire and the rise of
the Marathas. Although the founder Kamal-ud-din Khan lost some territory to the Marathas, he received Radhanpur as a jagir.
Bombay
In 1680, Abdul Rauf Khan (Muslim of Pathan origin) received a jagir of which Savanur was one part from Aurangzeb. The ruling family was attacked by Tipu Sultan (Mysore) but the
Marathas helped the Nawab regain some of his territory. Finally, the British recognized his right to rule Savanur on account of their loyalty during the last Anglo-Maratha war.
Bombay
Bombay (Sind) The founder descends from the Talpur clan of Sindh. The state was established around 1775 during succession disputes after the death of the clan chief, Mir Bahram Khan.
Founded by the Nizam of Hyderabad's grandson (Asaf Jah) around 1784 as a jagir from the Marathas. The British recognized his rule in 1806.
CIA
The founder, Dost Mohammad Kahn, was an Afghan who came to India following the death of Aurangzeb in 1707 and worked for the Mughal army. He established independent rule in
Bhopal by offering protection to the local population.
CIA
Gafur Khan (brother in law of Amir Khan - Tonk State), a mercenary of Afgan origins fought on behalf of the Marathas especially the Holkar and received the state in exchange for his
services.
CIA
The state was under the Mughal Empire and then Hyderabad (as a fief). The area was ceded to the East India Company by Hyderabad, but then restored by the Company to the original
family, descendants of Faiz Ali Khan.
Madras
The founding family comes from Sind and descends from the Abbasid Caliphs of Egypt. The state became independent during the break up of the Durrani Empire in India (Last Afghan
Empire) that had originally gained control of the territory from the Mughals.
Punjab
The founder, Yusufzai Khan of Pathan origin, was awarded the state as a land grant from Lord Lake (British military commander-in-chief) in 1806. He worked for Lord Lake and for the
Marathas before that.
Punjab
The founder Abmad Baksh Khan worked for the Mughals and the family were nobles in Aurangzeb's court. The state was a gift from Alwar and the East India Company for his loyalty in
fighting against the Bharapur State Jats.
Punjab
The founder Bayazid Khan was part of the Mughal army. He supposedly saved Aurangzeb's life and in exchange was allowed to establish his independent rule in the state.
Punjab
The founder, Talab Faiz Khan worked first for the Marathas and then Lord Lake (British military commander-in-chief). He received Pataudi for perpetuity from Lord Lake. The family
was originally settled in Patiala (a Sikh Princely State).
Punjab
The founder Amir Khan was an Afghan mercenary who fought on behalf of other Muslim leaders and then the Marathas in the late 18th century. He received the territory of Tonk from
Holkar (one of the Maratha chiefs) in exchange for his services.
Rajputana
A former province of the Mughal Empire. The state was founded by Asaf Jah, a military noble in Aurangzeb's court and the provincial governor of Hyderabad, who became strong
enough during the decline of the Mughal Emperor to establish Hyderabad as an independent state in the early 1700s.
South
The state was founded by the Rohilla Afghans (Pashtuns) after the Rohilla War of 1774-75 against the Nawabs of Oudh. They lost substantial territory in this war and established
Rampur with the help of the British.
UP
Region

* Jagir was a type of land grant (transferable) awarded by kings to military elites and allowed the holder to collect tax revenues from the area.

